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SENATOR EASTLAND'S ATTACK ON THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: AN
ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE
NORMANDOESEN t
On May 2, 1962, Senator James 0. Eastland of
Mississippi, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
made an extended attack on the Supreme Court.a He charged

that in a large number of cases the Justices of the Court had
voted "pro-Communist," thus threatening "fundamentally the
basic security of our country from the onslaught of the Communist conspiracy .... ,,b In support of his remarks, the
Senator inserted in the Congressional Record a chart of selected cases, which indicated how the individual Justices had
voted.c In Senator Eastland's words, "If the decision of the
individual judge was in favor of the position advocated by
the Communist Party, or the Communist sympathizer involved in the particularcase, it was scored as pro, meaning
pro-Communist. If the judge's decision was contrary to this
position, he was scored as con-or contrary." d
Shortly thereafter,Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York
requested Associate Professor Norman Dorsen of the New
York University School of Law to prepare a response to
Senator Eastland. This response was printed, following
prefatory remarks by Senator Javits, in the Congressional
Record of October 12, 1962.e Because the Editors of the
Law Review agree with Dean Griswold of the HarvardLaw
School that this reply deserves wider circulationi we reprint it below.
t Associate Professor of Law, New York University. A.B. 1950, Columbia University; LL.B. 1953, Harvard University. Member, District of Columbia and New
York Bars.
108 CONG. REc. 7026 (daily ed. May 2, 1962).

b Id.at 7027.

e Id. at 7028-29, 7030-31.

dId.at 7027.

108 CONG. REC. 22071-75 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1962).

Letter From Dean Erwin N. Griswold to Professor Norman Dorsen, Nov. 16,
(693)
1962.
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THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS REFERRED TO BY
SENATOR EASTLAND

Several years ago, one of this country's greatest jurists, the late
Learned Hand, counseled us wisely on the subject of criticism of the
judges of the Supreme Court and other courts, whether federal or
state. Judge Hand said:
While it is proper that people should find fault when
their judges fail, it is only reasonable that they should
recognize the difficulties. Perhaps it is also fair to ask that
before the judges are blamed they. shall be given the credit
of having tried to do their best. Let them be severely
brought to book, when they go wrong, but by those who will
take the trouble to understand.'
The valid technique for evaluating the work of the Supreme
Court is scrupulous legal analysis of the decisions themselves in light
of their historical antecedents. Senator Eastland's charges against
the members of the Supreme Court represent an entirely inconsistent
approach. They are completely unrelated to legal doctrine or historical
context. Instead, they focus solely on the results of cases, and measure
these results by a distorting and oversimplified standard. A subsequent section of this memorandum contains comment on certain unfortunate consequences of Senator Eastland's method of criticism.
This section will concentrate on legal analysis of the Supreme Court
cases referred to by Senator Eastland in his attack on the Court.
As Judge Learned Hand indicated, it is not a simple matter to
evaluate the work of the Supreme Court. The complexities of law
and fact make treacherous any but the most comprehensive analysis.
Nevertheless, inspection of a certain number of decisions may be helpful in demonstrating that the members of the Supreme Court, in the
cases singled out by Senator Eastland, used well-established legal doctrines in reaching their conclusions. That individual Justices can
differ as to the applicability of a legal doctrine in a particular case is
merely further proof of the difficulty of the judicial task assigned the
Supreme Court.
In view of limitations on space, only two methods of analysis will
be employed. These show: (a) that many of the cases cited by
Senator Eastland were decided on the basis of judicial precedent and
therefore obviously did not represent a break with the past; and
(b) that doctrines employed by the Court in cases involving national
security (Communism) are also employed in other types of cases.
IHAND, Hlow Far Is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?, in THE SPIr oF
LMI.RTY 103, 110 (3d ed. 1960).
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A. Legal Precedent
In Curcio v. United States,2 the question was whether the petitioner's personal privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth
amendment attached to questions relating to the whereabouts of certain
union books and records which he declined to produce pursuant to a
grand jury subpoena. The Court unanimously held that it did.
It was well established by prior cases that custodians of the
documents of associations, whether incorporated or unincorporated,
had no privilege with respect to such records.3 It was equally well
established that the custodian had a constitutional privilege to decline
to answer questions about the whereabouts of such records when they
no longer were in his possession. Thus, in Wilson v. United States,
Justice (later Chief Justice) Hughes said: "They [the custodians of
records] may decline to utter upon the witness stand a single selfcriminating word. They may demand that any accusation against
them individually be established without the aid of their oral testimony
...
)) ' And in Shapiro v. United States, the Court said, "Of
course all oral testimony by individuals can properly be compelled only
by exchange of immunity for waiver of privilege." ' In view of these
precedents, it is clear that the decision of the unanimous Court in the
Curcio case was solidly grounded.
In the area of fair administration of justice, Gold v. United
States6 is squarely based on Remter v. United States,7 which involved
income tax fraud. Gold had been convicted of filing a false nonCommunist affidavit and the district court judgment had been affirmed
by an equally divided court of appeals. One of the issues was whether
Gold had been deprived of a fair trial because "an F.B.I. agent, investigating another case in which falsity of a non-Communist affidavit
was also charged," 8 had asked 3 members of the jury whether they
had received propaganda literature, and also because other members of
the jury had heard of the FBI contacts.
In a 6 to 3 per curiam decision, the Supreme Court held that a
new trial should be granted, "because of official intrusion into the
2 354 U.S. 118 (1957). See Senator Eastland's Tabulation, 108 CONG. Rac. 7028
(daily
ed. May 2, 1962) [hereinafter cited as Tabulation].
3
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43

(1906).
4221 U.S. 361, 385 (1911).
5 335 U.S. 1, 27 (1948).
8s352 U.S. 985 (1957), cited in Tabulation.
7 347 U.S. 227 (1954), 350 U.S. 377 (1956).
8 Gold v. United States, 237 F2d 764, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
senting), rev'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 985 (1957).

(Bazelon, J., dis-
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privacy of the jury." ' It is true, as the dissenters stated in Gold, that
the earlier Remmer opinion had said that tampering with a juror was
only "presumptively prejudicial." 1D However, the Supreme Court in
its second opinion in the Remmer case had ruled that intrusion on a
jury could be deemed non-prejudicial only in the rarest instances. The
decision in the Gold case seems a highly appropriate application of the
Remmer doctrine; indeed, the facts indicate that there was at least as
much likelihood of prejudice in Gold as in Remmer.
A series of cases illustrating both the principle of stare decisis and
the fact that it is often difficult of application are Galvan v. Press,11
Rowoldt v. Perfetto,'2 and Niukkanen v. McAlexander."3 In Galvan
v. Press, it was held that an alien was properly ordered deported
under section 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950,14 two
Justices dissenting on the ground that the provision was unconstitutional. In the Rowoldt case, after a careful review of the legislative
history of the 1951 amendments to the Internal Security Act, a majority of the Court concluded that Congress did not intend the deportation of former members of the Communist Party unless their
association was "meaningful" and had "political implications." The
majority concluded that the one-year membership of the petitioner in
the party during which he "didn't get a penny" nor betrayed any
ideological identification with the party's unlawful aims was insufficient to warrant deportation. The dissenting Justices disagreed that
the 1951 amendments required a "meaningful association" with the
Communist Party, and thought that mere membership (which was
conceded) was sufficient.
In the third case, Niukkanen v. McAlexander, " the petitioner was
an alien who had been brought to this country when less than a year old
and who lived here for over 50 years. Although he was briefly a member of the party in the late 1930's, the testimony showed that he never
was an officeholder, never was employed by the party, and never represented the party on any occasion. There was also testimony, as in the
Rowoldt case, that the petitioner's sole interest in joining during the
depression was in "bread and butter" and the "sufferings of the people."
A majority of the Court held that because the trial examiner disbelieved
9 352 U.S. 985 (1957).
'Dd. at 985-86 (Reed, J., dissenting), quoting Renuner v. United States, 347
U.S. 227, 229 (1954).
11347 U.S. 522 (1954), cited in Tabulation.

U.S. 115 (1957), cited in Tabulation.
13362 U.S. 390 (1960), cited in Tabulation.
14 Internal Security Act of 1950, § 22, 64 Stat. 1006, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(1958).
15 362 U.S. 390 (1960).
12355
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certain testimony of the petitioner, the Rowoldt rule did not apply.
Four Justices disagreed on the ground that undisputed evidence put the
case squarely within the "meaningful association" rule of Rowoldt v.
Perfetto.
Ignoring the complex factual and legal issues in these cases, Senator Eastland simply counts as "pro-Communist" the votes of the
dissenters in the Galvan and Niukkanen cases, and the majority in the
Rowoldt case. 6
B. Application of Legal Doctrine to Non-Communist Cases
Some of the cases discussed immediately above had precedents not
involving national security. Many other cases referred to by Senator
Eastland involve doctrines that have been applied across the board, irrespective of the nature of the litigant before the Court.
1. Contempt Cases
Sacher v. United States 7 involved a contempt citation of defense
counsel for 11 Communist leaders who were convicted of violating the
Smith Act after a turbulent nine-month trial. During the Smith Act
trial the judge repeatedly warned counsel that their conduct was contemptuous. Immediately upon receiving the jury's verdict of guilty,
the judge, without further notice or hearing, found counsel guilty of
criminal contempt and sentenced them to prison. On appeal, a majority
of the Supreme Court affirmed the contempt conviction. The dissenting Justices contended that the citation for contempt should have been
tried before a jury; that it should not in any event have been tried before the same judge who conducted the Smith Act trial; and that a full
hearing was essential to due process of law. Senator Eastland has
characterized the dissenters' votes as "pro-Communist," presumably
because the defense counsel had been representing Communists on trial
under the Smith Act.
But procedural protections have been jealously guarded in all kinds
of contempt cases having nothing remotely to do with national security.
Just last term, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of an attorney held in contempt for his conduct during a civil antitrust suit.'"
Also last term, the Court held that the summary contempt power could
not be used to punish out-of-court statements of a sheriff attacking as
"agitation" and "intimidation" a grand jury investigation into alleged
block voting by Negroes.' 9
See Tabulation.
U.S. 1 (1952), cited in Tabulation.
18in re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962).
19 Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
36

17 343
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There are many other decisions in favor of individuals on trial
under the summary contempt power. In none of them could it fairly
be said that the Court, or the individual Justices, were doing more than
their duty to oversee the judiciary's awesome contempt power. Likewise, there is no basis for the conclusion that any sympathy existed for
the cause of the defendant, or with his conduct. As Justice Frankfurter said in dissent in the Sacher case itself:
I would not remotely minimize the gravity of the conduct
of which the petitioners have been found guilty, let alone condone it. But their intrinsic guilt is not relevant to the issue
before us. This Court brought the case here in order to consider whether the trial court followed the proper procedure in
determining that the misconduct of the petitioners subjected
them to punishment.

.

.

. Time out of mind this Court has

reversed convictions for the most heinous offenses, even
though no doubt about the guilt of the defendants was entertained. It reversed because the mode by which guilt was
established disregarded those standards of procedure which
are so precious and so important for our society.20
2. Free Speech Cases
Many of the cases cited by Senator Eastland involve freedom
of expression. In all of them the votes in favor of the individual's right
to speak or publish are regarded as "pro-Communist." 21
Many of the same constitutional arguments urged by the dissenting
Justices in the above cases, in all of which a majority ruled that no
first amendment violation occurred, were equally pressed in cases not
involving Communism.
Thus, in Beauharnaisv. Illinois,; a majority of the Court upheld
a conviction under a state criminal libel law against a speaker who was
exposing Negroes to "contempt, derision, and obloquy." The dissenting Justices claimed that the conviction was unconstitutional as invading the defendant's right to freedom of speech. In Terminiello v.
Chicago,23 a majority of the Court reversed a conviction for breach of
the peace based on the defendant's speech attacking Jews, Catholics, and
Negroes. The majority held that the defendant had a constitutional
right to express his views, no matter how unpopular and how odious.
It makes as much sense to say that the votes selected by Senator
Eastland were "pro-Communist" as to say that the Justices voting in
2 343 U.S. at 27-28.
2
1 Tabulation, citing Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) ; Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) ; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
22343 U.S. 250 (1952).
23337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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favor of the first amendment in the Beauharnaisand Terminiello cases
were anti-Negro, anti-Jewish, and anti-Catholic.
3. Statutory Interpretation
Many of the cases referred to by Senator Eastland involve questions of statutory interpretation. He characterizes as "pro-Communist"
certain votes in those cases without regard to their validity under established canons of interpretation.
a. Construction of Statutes To Avoid Constitutional Issues
It is well established that courts will attempt to interpret statutes
so as not to require a judicial ruling on constitutional questions. In the
words of Chief Justice Taft, "it is our duty in the interpretation of
federal statutes to reach a conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of
their constitutionality." 24 Again, as Chief Justice (then Justice) Stone
wrote, what Congress has written "must be construed with an eye to
possible constitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts as to its
validity." I A recent decision resting on this rule of statutory construction is United States v. Rumely, 26 in which the Court narrowly
construed a congressional resolution authorizing an investigation of
"lobbying activities" so as to include only "representations made directly to the Congress, its Members, or its committees" and not all
activities intending "to influence, encourage, promote or retard legislation." As a result, a contempt conviction of a purveyor of literature
of a conservative persuasion was overturned.
In United States v. Witkovich ,7 the Court interpreted section
242 (d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 28 so as to deny authorities the power to require an alien under a final order of deportation to
furnish information except with respect to his availability for deportation. A majority of the Court believed that serious constitutional questions under the first amendment would be presented by a contrary interpretation. Since the language of section 242(d) could fairly be
construed to limit the authority to request information, it did so.
Senator lEastland counts the votes in favor of a narrow interpreta29
tion of the statute in Witkovich as pro-Communist, presumably because many of the questions asked by immigration officials related to
24Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 346 (1928).
25

Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573, 577 (1929).

26345 U.S. 41 (1953).

27353

U.S. 194 (1957).

28 immigration and Nationality

8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (1958).
29 Tabulation.

Act of 1952, §242(d), 66 Stat. 211, as amended,
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Witkovich's possible membership in the Communist Party and activities on behalf of the party. Such a conclusion ignores the rule of
statutory construction, as illustrated by the cases discussed above, that
was in fact the basis for the decision.
b. Strict Construction of Penal Laws
A longstanding maxim of statutory interpretation cautions judges
to interpret criminal statutes strictly in order to be sure, before a person
is convicted and perhaps imprisoned, that defendants are punished only
for violations that they could have avoided. As Chief Justice Marshall
said over a century ago:
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded
on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and
on the plain principle, that the power of punishment is vested
in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the
legislature, not the court, which is to define a crime, and
ordain its punishment."
More recently, in United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.,-"
involving a prosecution for violation of minimum wage, overtime, and
recordkeeping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Court
reversed a conviction by applying this doctrine. The Court said:
Very early Mr. Chief Justice Marshall told us, "Where the
mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes
every thing from which aid can be derived .

.

.

."

United

States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386. Particularly is this so
when we construe statutes defining conduct which entail
stigma and penalties and prison. Not that penal statutes are
not subject to the basic consideration that legislation like all
other writings should be given, insofar as the language permits, a commonsensical meaning. But when choice has to be
made between two readings of what conduct Congress has
made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher
alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in
language that is clear and definite. We should not
derive
32
criminal outlawry from some ambiguous implication.
Senator Eastland lists among the votes labeled "pro-Communist"
cases in which certain Justices employed the canon of strictly construing
penal statutes.3 3 Whether or not they were correct in doing so is a
3

United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 35, 43 (1820).

;31344 U.S. 218 (1952).
32
Id.at 221-22.
33
Tabulation, citing, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) ; United
States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950).
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difficult question of law in each case. What is not difficult is to see that
the doctrine is a confirmed part of the law of legislative interpretation;
that its use is common in the Supreme Court in a wide variety of contexts; and that to brand Justices who use it in a case that happens to
involve national security as voting "pro-Communist" is totally unjustified.
II. THE GOOD FAITH OF THE JUSTICES
As already has been mentioned, the proper basis for criticism of
decisions of the Supreme Court is a rigorous legal and historical
analysis of the cases themselves. But because Senator Eastland did not
content himself with making charges based on such a standard, it is
necessary to go beyond the decisions and show the weaknesses of his
allegations in other respects.
In the course of his remarks, despite certain intimations in the
language employed, Senator Eastland at no point charged that individual members of the Supreme Court or the Court as an institution
ever had the motive of advancing the Communist cause of weakening
this country's ability to preserve its democratic form of government.
This is not surprising. To impute such motives to the men sitting on the Supreme Court would be ridiculous-tantamount to the
assertion, in a wide variety of other cases, that a vote in favor of a
particular result necessarily coincided with sympathy on the part of
the individual Justice for the litigant for whom he voted. Thus, to
suggest a "pro-Communist" purpose to the Justices of the Court would
be to make a similar charge in the following cases, among many others:
(1) That the votes of Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and
Rutledge in Adamson v. California,34 indicate their sympathy for murderers because they voted in favor of the position advocated by counsel
for accused murderers. The real question in that case was whether the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution
prohibited a state prosecutor from commenting on the fact that a criminal defendant did not take the stand to testify on his own behalf.
(2) That the votes of Justices Frankfurther, Black, Reed, Douglas, Jackson, Burton, Vinson, and Clark in Rochin v. California,3 5
indicate their sympathy for narcotics peddlers because they voted in
favor of the position advocated by counsel for alleged narcotics peddlers.
The real question was whether the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution permitted police to obtain evidence of a
narcotics violation by forcing an emetic solution through a tube inserted in a man's stomach.
34332 U.S. 46 (1947).
35342U.S. 165 (1952).
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(3) That the votes of Justices Clark, Black, Frankfurter, Douglas,
Jackson, Burton, Vinson, and Minton in Hoffman v. United States, 6
indicate their sympathy for racketeers because they voted in favor of a
position advocated by counsel for alleged racketeers. The real question
was whether an individual properly declined to answer questions during
a grand jury investigation on the ground that the privilege against selfincrimination of the fifth amendment to the Constitution justified the
refusal.
(4) That the votes of Justices Black, Douglas, Reed and Jackson
in Beauharnaisv. Illinois, 37 indicate their sympathy with racists because they voted in favor of a position taken by certain avowed racists.
The real question was whether the liberty of speech and of the press
guaranteed as against the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution prohibited a conviction for portraying "depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of citizens
of the Negro race."
(5) That the votes of Justices Douglas, Black, Reed, Burton and
Vinson in Terininiello v. Chicago,3 8 indicate their sympathy with Nazis
because they voted in favor of a position taken by a Nazi sympathizer.
The real question again involved the scope of the protection offered,
even to words calculated to invite sharp dispute and anger, by the free
speech guarantees of the Constitution.
(6) That the votes of Justices Douglas and Black in Hannah v.
Larche,39 indicate their sympathy with segregationists because they
voted in favor of a position restricting investigative rights of the
United States Commission on Civil Rights. The real question was
whether one Commission's rules of procedure denying to persons
against whom complaints have been filed the right of cross-examination
of witnesses are consistent with the protection offered by the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the Constitution.
It is no more bizarre to suggest that the present and past Justices
of the Supreme Court sympathize with the causes of the parties in the
above cases than to make the same suggestion in cases involving national security. Accordingly, it should be no surprise that Senator
Eastland refrained from charging that members of the Court were purposefully advancing the cause of Communism by their votes in the cases
he selected.
36341 U.S. 479 (1951).

3' 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
38337 U.S. 1 (1949).

39 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
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III.

SENATOR

EASTLAND'S

UNDERLYING

ASSUMPTIONS

If Senator Eastland did not mean to accuse the Supreme Court
of lending conscious aid to enemies of the United States, then he
meant that the effect of the Court decisions and the votes of individual
Justices aided Communism. This position, when analyzed, discloses
a particular attitude toward two distinct and important matters of
government: (1) the function of the Supreme Court of the United
States, including the proper basis-for criticism of its rulings, and (2)
the nature of the constitutional democracy known as the United States
of America. On both issues Senator Eastland's assumptions are subject to severe criticism.
A. The Supreme Court
At the outset, let it be made clear that the Supreme Court should
no more be immune from criticism than any other governmental organization in a functioning democracy. Such criticism is vital if the
Court is to reflect the general will of the people. But not all
criticism stands on an equal footing, and the charges leveled by Senator
Eastland neither fairly assess the work of the Court nor make any
contribution to its improvement.
Senator Eastland evaluates decisions of the Supreme Court according to their result and in so doing considers only one criterionwhether the decision is "pro-Communist" or "anti-Communist." Professor Robert Girard has pointed out that such epithets
signify nothing more than that their author either agrees
or does not agree with a particular decision or group of
decisions by the Court. If he thinks the Court should not
have interferred as it did, then you have "judicial legislation"
or, even worse, "judicial usurpation" depending upon the
intensity of the author's conviction. If the Court should have
stepped in when it did not the result is "judicial abnegation."
On the other hand if the Court's response meets his fancy
then you are blessed with "judicial restraint" or "judicial
statemanship."

40

Professor Henry M. Hart has pungently parodied the kind of
result-oriented criticism that Senator Eastland has engaged in: " 'One
up (or one down) for subversion,' 'One up (or one down) for civil
liberties . .
40
41

41

Girard, Book Reviev, 11 STAN. L. REv. 800, 804 (1959).
Hart, The Tme Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV.L. REv. 84, 125 (1959).
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Result-oriented criticism, like the accusations of Senator Eastland,
is unfair and narrow. It ignores the law governing a particular legal or
constitutional issue, and the reasoning by which a particular result is
reached.
Before a ruling of the Supreme Court can be properly evaluated, it is necessary to know more than which side won. It is necessary
to study the facts and the law governing a particular controversy, including the arguments prepared by counsel versed in the case. A
proper respect for the Court requires such candid recognition of the
competing legal claims and constitutional values. Proper criticism
takes account of this, and judges the Court according to professional
standards appropriate to its work.
Once again, it must be repeated, the Supreme Court does not and
should not stand above criticism. But the criticism must be intelligent
and discriminating, fitting to the high function of our highest Court.
Perhaps the true standard for critics of the Court should be the same
as that to which we expect the Justices themselves to adhere. In the
words of Dean Griswold of Harvard Law School:
It is a process requiring great intellectual power, an
open and inquiring and resourceful mind, and often courage,
especially intellectual courage, and the power to rise above
oneself. Even more than intellectual acumen, it requires
intellectual detachment and disinterestedness, rare qualities
approached only through constant awareness of their elusiveness, and constant striving to attain them.4"
Senator Eastland's criticism surely does not measure up to this
exacting and high standard.
B. Constitutional Philosophy
As already mentioned, the sole guide to Supreme Court decisions,
according to Senator Eastland, is whether the ruling is or is not "proCommunist." " The fallaciousness of this standard as a means of
judging the work of the Supreme Court has already been discussed.
This portion of the memorandum will deal with some implications of
this standard for our constitutional democracy.
In almost every case cited by Senator Eastland, an individual,
several individuals, or an organization was asserting a claim under the
Constitution of the United States. In some of these cases the claim
42Griswold, Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74
H. v. L. REv. 81, 94 (1960).
43 108 CONG. REc. 7027 (daily ed. May 2, 1962).
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was accepted by the Court, on other occasions it was rejected. Senator
Eastland's view is that when the claim was recognized by a Justice,
his vote was "pro-Communist." This is an incorrect and dangerous
attitude in terms of the high purposes of the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights.
Why should not a vote in favor of a constitutional claim be
Do not
counted "pro-American" rather than "pro-Communist"?
such votes serve to extend the liberties protected by the Constitution?
Why could it not be said, with fervor at least equal to that of Senator
Eastland's, that when a vote is cast in favor of freedom of speech or
of the press or of religion, or to protect individuals against unwarranted searches of their homes or person, or to assure criminal defendants a fair trial, or to invalidate governmental action that discriminates on the basis of race, creed, or color, that the Justice is
fulfilling the high trust imposed upon him by his oath to "uphold the
Constitution of the United States"?
The precedeit for this view, contrary to Senator Eastland's, is
long and weighty. The principal architect of the Constitution, James
Madison, said in the very first Congress that "independent tribunals
of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians
of those rights .

.

.

.,

Madison was speaking of rights guaranteed

to the people by the Bill of Rights.
The decisive importance to this country of the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights can be illustrated by taking two brief excerpts from talks recently delivered by members of the Harvard Law
School faculty to audiences abroad in which -they described the essence
of the American system. Senator Eastland's chart includes different
types of cases involving the Bill of Rights; a high proportion of these
cases concern freedom of speech and the rights of those accused of
crime. Professor Livingston Hall had this to say about the rights
of the accused:
Our traditional and cultural heritage of due process of law
has greatly inspired and influenced the lives and activities of
the millions of individuals, living and dead, who have made
up Anglo-American society. Rules of criminal procedure
which treat human beings as individuals, and hold each one
individually responsible only for his own acts, leave them free
to go about their business, secure in the knowledge that they
will not be unjustly punished by the State. This had a great
effect in releasing their energy for productive and imaginative
ends 5
441 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (1789).
45 Hall, The Rights of the Accused in Criminal Cases, in TALxS ON A.tmCAN
N
"
O
LAW 55, 68-69 (Berman ed. 1961).
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And, in discussing the pivotal right of free expression, Professor
Roger Fisher said:
Fundamental among the purposes of the first amendment
is the role of free expression in the democratic process. Free
expression is a means of developing public opinion. Free expression is an aid to an intelligent choice. And free expression provides an opportunity to make a choice. New and
better ideas are most likely to be developed in a community
which allows free discussion of any ideas. Without discussion who can be sure which ideas are right and which ideas
are wrong? Finally, freedom of expression serves as an
outlet for resentments and hostilities that otherwise might
find more dangerous expression.4
A particularly moving statement of the enduring value of the
freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution has been made by Professor
Charles Black of the Yale Law School. It capsulizes the reasons for
believing that decisions of the Supreme Court and votes by individual
Justices in favor of enforcing the provisions of the Bill of Rights are
patriotic in the most meaningful sense.
Consider the place of these phrases "equal protection,"
"freedom of speech," and the rest in the moral life of our
Nation. They state our highest aspirations. They are our
political reason for being; they are the things we talk about
when we would persuade ourselves or others that our country
deserves well of history, deserves to be rallied to in its
present struggle with a system in which "freedom of speech"
is freedom to say what is welcome to authority, and "equal
protection" is the equality of the cemetery. Surely such
words, standing where they do and serving such a function
are to be construed with the utmost breadth."
As wholeheartedly as one may subscribe to the above views, it is
well to recall that they do not decide concrete cases. To decide properly, as has been emphasized above, one must study and reflect upon the
law, the facts, and the contentions of the parties.
The point here is different, but no less important. It is that
Senator Eastland's methodology depreciates the constitutional protections that all Americans enjoy. It is impossible to accept the facile
label "pro-Communist" without recognizing that the Senator includes
within that definition Supreme Court decisions and votes of individual
Justices that enforce the Bill of Rights-decisions and votes that do
46 Fisher, The ConstitutionalRight of Freedom of Speech, in id. at 85, 88-89.
47 Black, Old and New Ways in Judicial Review, Bowdoin College Bulletin, No.

328, p. 11 (1958).
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not seem alien to our heritage, but, on the contrary, are in the finest
American tradition.
The attack by Senator Eastland on the Supreme Court and its
members has now been analyzed from several points of view. Examination of a sample of the pertinent cases indicates that the rulings
of the Court rest on solid ground. Moreover, there is no basis for
any possible claim that in their rulings the Justices were motivated by
sympathy for Communism. Finally, the simplistic criterion employed
by Senator Eastland in evaluating the work of the Supreme Court
("pro-Communist" or "anti-Communist" decisions) has no validity
in terms of the Court's complex constitutional role. Accordingly, it
must be concluded that Senator Eastland's charges are wholly without
foundation.

